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Real Property
by T. Daniel Brannan*
and
William J. Sheppard**

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys case law and legislative developments in the area
of real property law in Georgia during the period from June 1, 1999, to
May 31, 2000. As in past surveys, the authors do not attempt to
chronicle each case and statute that affects real property law. Rather,
the authors selected the decisions and statutes discussed in this Article
for their significance and interest to participants in the everyday
practice of real estate law in this state. Several cases discussed below
revisited issues from recent surveys and enlarged upon or clarified the
holdings from those prior cases.
II.

TITLE TO LAND

1

.In Burt v. Skrzyniarz, the Georgia Supreme Court defined the
evidentiary burden required for a party to rebut the presumption of
equal shares in a cotenancy.' According to the court, that presumption
may only be rebutted through proof of "clear and convincing evidence"
showing that the parties share their tenancy other than in equal
proportions.3
* Partner in the firm of Morris, Manning & Martin, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia
State University (B.A., 1979); Mercer University (J.D., 1982). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
** Partner in the firm of Morris, Manning & Martin, L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1986); Mercer University (J.D., cum laude, 1992). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
The authors wish to acknowledge the significant contributions of Sarah Long and
Heather Seigel to the completion of this Article.
1. 272 Ga. 35, 526 S.E.2d 848 (2000).
2. Id. at 36-37, 526 S.E.2d at 850.
3. Id.
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The two cotenants in the case, Paul Burt and Nancy Skrzyniarz, began
dating in 1990. In 1997 the couple purchased a home in Dutch Island,
Georgia. The sales contract for the house obligated both Burt and
Skrzyniarz as purchasers of the property, and it was undisputed that
they took possession of the house as tenants in common. The deed from
the seller to Burt
and Skrzyniarz identified both parties as the grantees
4
of the property.
When they separated, a dispute arose between Burt and Skrzyniarz
concerning their interests in the property. Burt contended that he
owned a ninety-nine percent interest in the property and that Skrzyniarz
owned only one percent. Burt filed a complaint for statutory partitioning
in which he sought a determination of his interest in the property.
During the trial of Burt's claim, third parties involved in the purchase
and sale of the property introduced evidence that Burt and Skrzyniarz
were to hold title to the property jointly. Following the trial the jury
rejected Burt's argument and found the couple had equal shares in the
property. Burt appealed from the judgment entered on that verdict.'
Burt's argument on appeal focused on the instructions the trial court
gave to the jury. In its jury charge, the trial court had instructed the
jury that "'[u]nless... the document or instrument provides otherwise,
a tenancy in common is created whenever [sic] ... two or more persons
are entitled to the simultaneous possession of any property. Tenants in
common may have unequal shares, but they will be held to be equal
unless the contrary appears."'6 Additionally, the trial court instructed
the jury that "[plarol or oral evidence of the nature of the transaction or
the circumstances or the conduct of the parties is admissible to rebut the
presumption of equal shares [between tenants in common], but in order
to rebut the presumption, the proof must be clear and convincing."7 It
was this second instruction that Burt objected to on appeal.8

4. Id. at 35, 526 S.E.2d at 849.
5. Id. at 36, 526 S.E.2d at 850.
6. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 44-6-120 (1991)). That instruction was based on the language
contained in the 1991 version of O.C.G.A. section 44-6-120.
7. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
8. Id. Burt also contended on appeal that the trial court's jury instruction regarding
the presumption of equal shares was incompatible with its instruction to the jury regarding
a purchase money resulting trust. As a result, Burt asserted that the trial court should
not have instructed on a tenancy in common at all. Id. at 37, 526 S.E.2d at 850. A
purchase money resulting trust arises when the purchase price of property is paid by one
person but the vendor transfers the property to another. Under those circumstances, the
transferee is deemed to hold the property in trust for the person furnishing the
consideration. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1235 (6th ed. 1990); see also O.C.G.A. § 53-1292 (a), (b) (1997). The court stated that the concept of a purchase money constructive trust
is simply an alternative theory to that of a joint tenancy and that no error arose when the
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The court rejected Burt's argument and affirmed the trial court.9 In
its opinion the court noted the "axiom that, under normal circumstances,
tenants in common hold equal shares in jointly held property is a
fundamental precept the of law, and should not be easily subjected to
uncertainty or undoing."' ° Using that concept as a springboard, the
court noted similar contexts in which a "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard is applied. 1 For example, clear and convincing evidence
must be presented when one seeks to have a deed set aside or reformed
or when one seeks to show that a purchaser of property who makes a
conveyance
to his or her spouse, parent or child did not intend to make
12
a gift.

The critical issue for the court in Burt in imposing such a high
evidentiary burden in this case was the reliance placed on the "wellestablished presumptions attending a property owner's actions."1 The
court's decision shows the need for certainty in real estate transactions
and gives tremendous deference to the parties' actions in determining
what the effect of a given transaction may be.
In Jones v. Bowen, 4 the Georgia Court of Appeals revisited an issue
discussed in the 1997 survey, namely that a deed incorporating a
recorded plat by reference as to the legal description has the same effect
as if the information on the recorded plat were actually reflected in the
deed. 5 The boundary dispute in Jones arose from John Robert Jones'
January 1999 purchase of two parcels of land from Dorothy R. Zeitower,
Lillian R. Stephenson, and Christopher C. Ryals (collectively the
"Sellers"). Prior to the purchase, Jones employed George William
Donaldson to survey the property. The plat prepared by Donaldson,
dated December 31, 1998, was recorded in the Candler County Courthouse. 6 The deed described the property as follows:
All those two certain parcels of land situate lying in a body together
in the 1685th G.M. District of Candler County, Georgia and in the
aggregate containing 945.064 acres, more or less, all as shown on a plat

trial court instructed the jury with regard to both theories. 272 Ga. at 37-38, 526 S.E.2d
at 851-52 (citing Freeman v. Saxton, 240 Ga. 309, 310-12, 240 S.E.2d 708, 709-11 (1977)).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 36-37, 526 S.E.2d at 850.
12. Id. at 37, 526 S.E.2d at 850.
13. Id.
14. 244 Ga. App. 300, 535 S.E.2d 501 (2000).
15. See T. Daniel Brannan & William J. Sheppard, Real Property, 49 MERCER L. REV.
257, 263-64 (1997) (discussing Reidling v. Holcomb, 225 Ga. App. 229, 483 S.E.2d 624
(1997)).
16. 244 Ga. App. at 300-01, 535 S.E.2d at 503.
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of survey prepared for John Robert Jones by George William Donaldson, Registered Surveyor, dated December 31, 1998, and of record in
Plat Book 8, Page 85, Candler County, Georgia records, to which plat
and the record thereof reference is hereby made and incorporated
herein ....
The Grantors intend to convey all of their interest in the tract of
land conveyed to Grantors by Executor's and Trustee's Deed, dated
February 27, 1997, and recorded in Deed Book 149, Pages 4-5, Candler
County, Georgia records, which has been resurveyed by aforesaid plat.
Said tract of land is7 described in said deed as containing 996 acres of
land, more or less.1
The 1998 Plat followed the markers used in a survey plat created in
1981. However, a 1972 plat was also recorded in Candler County
depicting the same property. That plat showed an additional 16.3-acre
tract (the "Disputed Tract") as part of the property. Jones claims that
he discovered the 1972 Plat shortly after he purchased the property.
The 1998 Plat showed the Disputed Tract as part of property owned by
adjoining property owners (the "Neighbors"). However, it was uncontested that the Disputed Tract had once been a part of the property owned
by Sellers."8
Based on the discrepancy between the 1972 Plat and the 1998 Plat,
plus the language of the deed showing the Sellers' intent to transfer all
of their interest in the property, Jones filed a complaint against the
Neighbors. Jones claimed in his complaint that the Disputed Parcel was
transferred to him by the warranty deed from the Sellers. 9 Jones
sought to have the property resurveyed to confirm the boundary between
his property and the Neighbors' property. Jones also sought temporary
and permanent injunctions to restrain the Neighbors from further
clearing the Disputed Tract, along with compensatory damages for
trespass arising from clearing that had already been done.
The
Neighbors filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the
trial court granted. Jones appealed.2 °
On appeal Jones argued that language in the deed describing the
property being conveyed should be construed in accordance with the
intent of his predecessors in title.2 ' According to Jones, the Sellers
intended to convey "all of the interest they acquired in the property by

17. Id. at 300, 535 S.E.2d at 503.
18. Id. at 301, 535 S.E.2d at 503.
19. Id. at 302, 535 S.E.2d at 503. Jones attached to his complaint a copy of the
warranty deed from the Sellers. Id. at 301, 535 S.E.2d at 503.
20. Id. at 300, 535 S.E.2d at 502.
21. Id. at 302, 535 S.E.2d at 503.
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means of the executor's and trustee's deed."22 Jones argued that the
recitation in the deed concerning the number of acres being transferred
showed clearly the Sellers' intent to convey the Disputed Tract to
Jones. 23 The court of appeals rejected Jones' argument and affirmed
the trial court's decision.2 4 In doing so the court noted that the deed
to Jones expressly incorporated the 1998 Plat as describing the property
being sold and reflected all the interest of Jones' predecessors in title.25
The court relied on the absence of an express covenant in the deed
regarding the precise number of acres being transferred in order to find
the incorporation of the plat controlling over the general statement of
acreage.2"
Jones also argued that the supreme court's decision in Wooten v.
Solomon27 required a rejection of the 1998 Plat in favor of the 1972
Plat.2s Jones asserted "that 'a previous particular description' of
property is determinative of the property conveyed under a deed in the
event of a conflict with the plat with which it is associated."29 The
court distinguished the facts in Wooten from the facts in Jones and
concluded that the rule in Wooten is limited to cases when the plat
reference in a deed and other descriptions of the property also contained
in the deed are in conflict.3" Further, the court found that, as a result

22.

Id. The property was specifically identified as containing two parcels as follows:
Parcel One: All that certain... parcel of land situate ...,containing 497.731
acres, more or less, as shown and depicted as Parcel 1A on a plat prepared for
John Robert Jones by George William Donaldson, Registered Surveyor and
hereinabove made a part of this description by reference ...[and]
Parcel Two: All that certain ... parcel of land situate ... containing 447.333
acres, more or less, as shown and depicted as Parcel 1B on a plat prepared for
John Robert Jones by George William Donaldson, Registered Surveyor and

hereinabove made a part of this description by reference ....
Id. at 301, 535 S.E.2d at 503.
23. Id. at 302, 535 S.E.2d at 503.
24. Id. at 303, 535 S.E.2d at 504.
25. Id. at 302, 535 S.E.2d at 503.
26. Id., 535 S.E.2d at 503-04. "Absent an express covenant indicating that a given
number of acres are conveyed, a clause as to quantity will be rejected in favor of the actual
area if that is ascertainable by metes and bounds description." Id. (citing Martin v. Patton,
225 Ga. App. 157, 163-64, 483 S.E.2d 614, 621 (1997)). In the deed to Jones, the Sellers
specifically disclaimed any representation regarding the specific acreage of the property.

Id.
27. 139 Ga. 433, 77 S.E. 375 (1913).
28. 244 Ga. App. at 302, 535 S.E.2d at 504.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 302-03, 535 S.E.2d at 504.
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of incorporation, the property description in the 1998 plat was the same
as the description contained in the deed.3'
III.

EASEMENTS AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

The court in Lovell v. Anderson,3 2 also discussed a topic addressed in
a prior survey.3 3 The dispute in Lovell concerned the use of a dirt road
owned by Jeremiah Earle Field. Field's nephew, Lovell, used the road
to access his two properties (the "Three-acre Tract" and the "Thirty-oneacre Tract" respectively).
The Three-acre Tract was admittedly
accessible from a public highway, but Lovell testified that the Thirtyone-acre Tract was only accessible from the dirt road. Prior to his death,
Field granted Lovell permission to use the dirt road on Field's property
by issuing the following written statement: "Earle Lovell has permit to
go on any of my land, has the right to tell anyone without written permit
to leave."34 After Field died, Wendell Anderson, Sr., the executor of
Field's estate, demanded that Lovell cease using the dirt road and any
other property owned by the estate. When Lovell refused, Anderson filed
35
suit.
In the complaint Anderson asserted claims for injunctive relief, specific
performance, trespass, private nuisance, conversion, and punitive
damages. Anderson's claims for damages derived from, among other
things, Lovell's use of the estate's property to grow and sell Christmas
trees. Lovell filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that
the 1989 statement written by Field granted Lovell an easement in gross
to utilize the dirt road or, in the alternative, that it was a license that
had ripened into an easement.36
Anderson moved for partial summary judgment on the main claim as
to Lovell's liability for damages and on Lovell's counterclaim. Anderson
contended that Lovell's license to traverse the dirt road was revoked
upon Field's death. Anderson submitted the affidavit of a title expert
who asserted that the records of Cherokee County, Georgia, did not
reflect an easement granted to Lovell to use the dirt road. The trial
court granted the executor's motion, reserving the issue of damages for
trial, and Lovell appealed.37 The court of appeals rejected Lovell's

31. Id. at 303, 535 S.E.2d at 504.
32. 242 Ga. App. 537, 530 S.E.2d 233 (2000).
33. See T. Daniel Brannan & William J. Sheppard, Real Property, 50 MERCER L. REV.
307, 311-12 (1998) (discussing McCorkle v. Morgan, 268 Ga. 730, 492 S.E.2d 891 (1997)).
34. 242 Ga. App. at 538, 530 S.E.2d at 234.
35. Id. at 537-38, 530 S.E.2d at 235.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 538, 530 S.E.2d at 235.
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argument that questions of fact remained to be decided at trial on his
two alternative theories of recovery and affirmed the trial court's
decision to grant partial summary judgment. 8
In rejecting Lovell's argument concerning the license that allegedly
ripened into an easement, the court relied on Official Code of Georgia
Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 44-9-49 and McCorkle v. Morgan.4 ° In
McCorkle the Georgia Supreme Court held that a parol license can be
revoked when the licensee's enjoyment of the license was not preceded
by the necessary expenditure of money.41 Under the facts of Lovell,
there were two potential points at which Field could be deemed to have
granted Lovell a license that could have matured into an easement: (1)
when Lovell first began using the road and (2) when Field wrote the
statement formally giving Lovell access. 42 The court found no evidence
of an expenditure of money by Lovell at either time in reliance on the
license.4 3 The evidence in the record on summary judgment established
that Lovell had used the road since he acquired the Three-acre Tract and
the Thirty-one-acre Tract in approximately 1970. The first expenditure
that Lovell made in connection with his use of the road occurred in 1986
or 1987, when he installed a gate. Thus, Lovell used the road for at
least sixteen years before he put up the gate. Similarly, Lovell made no
expenditure in reliance upon the granting of a license in 1989 when
Field's statement was written. Lovell had already installed the gate on
the road at least two years before Field gave him the written statement." In short, "'it was not necessary for [Lovell] to expend any
money preceding [his] use of the [road]."'45 Accordingly, the court held
the license never ripened into an easement.46 Therefore, it was revoked
upon Field's death.4 7

38. Id. at 538-39, 530 S.E.2d at 235-36.
39. Id. O.C.G.A. § 44-9-4 states as follows:
A parol license to use another's land is revocable at any time if its revocation does
no harm to the person to whom it has been granted. A parol license is not
revocable when the licensee has acted pursuant thereto and in so doing has
incurred expense; in such a case, it becomes an easement running with the land.
O.C.G.A. § 44-9-4 (1982).
40. 268 Ga. 730, 492 S.E.2d 891 (1997).
41. Id. at 730, 492 S.E.2d at 892.
42. 242 Ga. App. at 537-38, 530 S.E.2d at 234-35.
43. Id. at 539, 530 S.E.2d at 235.
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting McCorkle, 268 Ga. at 731, 492 S.E.2d at 235).
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Cook v. Pridgen, Stapler & Dunn, 45 Ga. 331, 340-41, 12 Am. Rep. 582,
584 (1872)).
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The court also rejected Lovell's argument regarding the creation of an
"easement in gross." 8 The court began its analysis by setting forth the
definition of an easement in gross:
An easement in gross is defined as "a right to pass over land which is
not given for the purpose of ingress or egress to and from other land
...." It is "a personal right and [one] not running with the land on
the benefit side." It may be created by express grant. "Since an
easement is an interest in land, however, a grant of an easement
should be drawn and executed with the same formalities as a deed to
real estate .. .
The court then held the permit given to Lovell by Field did not
constitute a grant of an easement under Georgia law.5" The court
stated that "[an express grant of an easement must contain language
sufficient to designate with reasonable certainty the land over which it
extends. It is generally sufficient to identify the whole tract of land
owned by the grantor over which the easement passes."51 Adopting the
language of Central of Georgia Railroad v. Dec Ass'n, the court held the
1989 statement "was neither a deed nor in a form that could be recorded
with the Clerk of the Superior Court on the deed records ....
[I]t had
no legal description to identify the property or easement .... 52 At
best, the agreement was merely a revocable license.53
In Hood v. Spruill,5 4 the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the
longstanding rule that when a purchaser has knowledge of a public road
on land, the encumbrance does not constitute a breach of the covenant
of warranty.5 Leontina and Alfred Hood purchased a tract of land on
the corner of East Cobb Drive and Johnson Ferry Road in Cobb County,
Georgia, in order to build a car repair shop. After the Hoods had begun
construction, another business owner in the area sued them for
encroaching on a roadway easement that ran across the Hoods' property.
As it turned out, the Hoods' property contained a fifty-foot-wide roadway
easement with a paved road known as Five Points Lane running down

48. Id., 530 S.E.2d at 236.
49. Id. at 539-40, 530 S.E.2d at 236 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 540, 530 S.E.2d at 236 (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-9-1).
51. Id. (quoting Central of Ga. R.R. v. Dec Ass'n, 231 Ga. App. 787, 790-91,501 S.E.2d
6, 10 (1998)).
52. Id. (quoting Central of Ga. R.R., 231 Ga. App. at 790-91, 501 S.E.2d at 10).
53. Id.
54. 242 Ga. App. 44, 528 S.E.2d 565 (2000).
55. Id. at 45, 528 S.E.2d at 566.
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the middle. Five Points Lane provided public access to surrounding
roads and businesses.56
Although the Hoods admitted they knew of the roadway easement
before purchasing the property, they asserted claims against their seller,
Spruill, based on breach of the general warranty deed given at closing,
"which guaranteed title to the property against the lawful claims of all
persons whomsoever." 7 Spruill filed a motion for summary judgment,
and it was granted.5"
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling.59 The court
held the roadway was a public road across private land."0 The court
stated that "[wihile the roadway easement is described in various ways
in the documents of record before this Court, use is the determinative
factor in designating it as 'private' or 'public.' 6'1 The undisputed
evidence showed the private drive was used as a public roadway for cars
to access Johnson Ferry Road and businesses on East Cobb Drive. 2
Additionally, public records described the roadway easement as a "nonexclusive easement appurtenant for ingress and egress for pedestrian
and vehicular traffic and utility purposes over, on, and across the
property." 3 From this evidence, the court determined the easement
was a public one."
After concluding the roadway was for public use, the court noted it is
longstanding law that the existence of a public road on land, which is
known to the purchaser, is not an encumbrance that would constitute a
breach of the covenant of warranty.65 The court stated as follows:
To hold that a public road running through a tract of land, which was
known to the purchaser at the time of his purchase thereof, is such an
incumbrance on the land as would constitute a breach of a covenant of
warranty against incumbrances, would produce
a crop of litigation in
66
this state that would almost be interminable.

56. Id. at 44, 528 S.E.2d at 566.
57. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
58. Id.
59. Id., 528 S.E.2d at 567.
60. Id., 528 S.E.2d at 566.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 45, 528 S.E.2d at 566.
63. Id. at 45 n.1, 528 S.E.2d at 566 n.1 (internal quotations omitted).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 45, 528 S.E.2d at 566 (citing Desvergers v. Willis, 56 Ga. 515, 516, 21 Am.
Rep. 289, 290 (1876)).
66. Id., 528 S.E.2d at 566-67.
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The Hoods clearly knew about the public roadway easement at the time
they entered into the purchase agreement. In fact, the purchase contract
itself stated that the property was "inclusive of an easement for transit
across the property as shown on the exhibits and is acknowledged by
purchaser."67
Additionally, the plat for the property specifically
identified the existence of an easement 50.89 feet wide. 6 Finally, the
Hoods' broker testified that, at the closing, the title insurance representative took approximately twenty minutes to show the Hoods all the
easements on the property, including the fifty-foot wide easement that
"must remain open for pubic ingress and egress."69
It is difficult for the authors to conceive of a situation when a
purchaser could more clearly be deemed to have notice of a public
roadway encumbrance on her property than was true in Hood v. Spruill.
The only thing surprising about the holding in this case is that the
appellee apparently made no motion for entry of sanctions against the
appellant based upon the assertion of a frivolous appeal.
In Bibb County v. Georgia Power Co. ,7 the Georgia Court of Appeals
addressed several issues surrounding an easement that Georgia Power
used for its utility poles.7' Of particular importance, the court decided
whether Bibb County had to reimburse the utility for the relocation of
those poles due to a road-widening project.72
In the late 1940s and early 1950s Georgia Power obtained and
recorded indefinite easements conveyed by private landowners with
property adjacent to an approximately twenty-foot wide road that would
later become known as Northside Drive in Macon, Georgia. These
indefinite easements allowed Georgia Power to place power poles and
distribution lines across the properties. Once the poles were placed, the
easements became definite. From 1957 to 1965, Bibb County condemned
or purchased title to a portion of the same properties across which
Georgia Power had easements. As a result, by 1965 Bibb County owned
fee simple title to an eighty-foot right-of-way for Northside Drive.
However, Bibb County did not condemn the Georgia Power easements.73
In 1965 Bibb County deeded title of the eighty-foot right-of-way to the
Georgia Rural Roads Authority ("the Roads Authority") for road

67.
68.

Id., 528 S.E.2d at 566.
Id.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
241 Ga. App. 131, 525 S.E.2d 136 (1999).
Id. at 133-39, 525 S.E.2d at 138-42.
Id. at 139, 525 S.E.2d at 142.
Id. at 132, 525 S.E.2d at 137-38.
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construction. During March through August 1967, Georgia Power, at its
own expense, relocated its power poles to accommodate the road
construction. Nineteen of those poles were moved anywhere from ten to
thirteen feet. Another eighteen, not shown on some plats, also may have
been moved. In 1990 the Georgia Highway Authority, successor to the
Roads Authority, deeded the property back to Bibb County. The City of
Macon then annexed small portions of the road. In 1995 and 1996 Bibb
County requested Georgia Power relocate approximately one hundred
poles to accommodate another road widening project along Northside
Drive. Georgia Power agreed to move the poles but only if the county
paid the expenses associated with the relocation.74
Bibb County and the City of Macon then filed a declaratory action to
force Georgia Power to relocate the poles at its own expense. Plaintiffs
also asserted claims for delay damages, trespass, breach of contract,
punitive damages and attorney fees. Bibb County later added a claim
for damages for violating the antigratuity clause of the Georgia
Constitution. Georgia Power asserted a counterclaim seeking compensation for moving the utility poles on an inverse condemnation theory.75
The trial court ordered Georgia Power to relocate the poles and
reserved the issue of reimbursement for later determination. On
motions for partial summary judgment regarding thirty-seven of the
poles, the trial court ruled in favor of Georgia Power's recouping
relocating expenses in two separate orders.76 The County and City
appealed.7 7
In arguing for summary judgment, the parties first focused on the
validity of a 1941 agreement between Bibb County and Georgia Power,
in which Georgia Power agreed in part to relocate poles in a county
right-of-way at its expense. 8 The court noted that the paragraph from
the 1941 agreement concerning relocation costs applied only to poles
"placed under or prior to this agreement," which included poles
permissively constructed in county rights-of-way pursuant to an
application process set forth in the agreement.7 9 The poles at issue in
the case, however, were placed pursuant to the private landowner
agreements, not the 1941 agreement. Furthermore, when the poles were
relocated in 1967, Bibb County did not own the land; thus they were not

74.
75.
76.
poles.
77.
78.
79.

Id., 525 S.E.2d at 138.
Id.
Id. One order concerned nineteen of the poles, and the other concerned eighteen
Id.
Id.
Id. at 133, 525 S.E.2d at 138.
Id.
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placed in county rights-of-way.8 ° For those reasons, the court held that
the 1941 Agreement did not apply."'
With respect to reimbursement for moving the thirty-seven poles, the
court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of Georgia Power on the grounds that factual disputes precluded
judgment as a matter of law. 2 First, a question existed as to "whether
Georgia Power had an established easement at the time Bibb County
asked it to relocate its poles in 1996. The written easements obtained
from the private landowners prior to 1967 were indefinite easements
that became definite by the actual placement of the poles."8 3 Second,
a dispute existed as to whether Georgia Power had placed poles along all

of the easements prior to the county obtaining the eighty-foot right-ofway from the property owners, and if so, where they were placed. 4
Lastly, an issue existed arising from the relocation of some poles in
1967.
Once established, Georgia Power's easements could not be
changed without the landowner granting an additional easement or
through condemnation. 5 The court relied on Jackson Electric Membership Corp. v.Echols"s to explain this rule:
"To construe the original easement in any other manner would be to
authorize the [utility] to eventually take all the [landowners'] land if
the necessities of their business dictated, without requiring the
payment of any additional damages or compensation to the landowners

80. Id.
81. Id. A franchise agreement with the City also was found not to apply. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 134, 525 S.E.2d at 139. Georgia Power did not retain records showing the
placement of poles from the early time periods; the earliest documents showing any use are
the county's road paving plans for Northside Drive created in 1957 and revised in 1965,
which reflect only fifteen poles on the south side of the road. To counter Georgia Power's
evidence (consisting of extrapolations from those plans and the vague recollections of
various individuals about the location of some of the poles), the County submitted the
affidavit of an expert who, based on an analysis of aerial photographs of the area from
1960, disputed the placement, number and maintenance of the poles. The County also
submitted the 1957/1965 plat showing only some of the poles in place and gaps in other
places (along with other expert testimony that the gaps would indicate the absence of
poles). Finally, the County submitted a 1968 plat (accompanied by expert testimony)
showing the poles apparently ended before reaching one of the areas in question as they
were not shown to continue on property farther west. Id. at 134, 525 S.E.2d at 139.
85. Id. at 133-34, 525 S.E.2d at 139.
86. 84 Ga. App. 610, 66 S.E.2d 770 (1951).
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no matter how great the [landowners'] losses might be as a result
thereof.""7
Georgia Power claimed that because it relocated at least some of the
poles at issue to the south only ten to thirteen feet for the first road
widening, it stayed within the thirty-foot easement width it had
purchased from the landowners and, thus, was not changing or
abandoning its easements but was simply relocating the poles within
their allowed general area." The court held, however, that whether
relocating a power pole several feet to one side is within the "general
area" of an easement is a question for the jury.8 9 Additionally, the
court noted that because Georgia Power allegedly maintained a fifteenfoot clearance on the north and south sides of the poles, moving a pole
thirteen feet to the south necessarily would require the entire easement
to move to the south to accommodate the clearance.9" The question for
the court was "whether the particular movement of the poles was a
change in the degree or kind of the easement, for the changed locations
may be found to 'occupy a general area beyond the outer limits of the
space previously occupied."' 91
A final issue regarding the validity of the easements was whether they
legitimately followed the first relocation pursuant to a Georgia Highway
Department policy.92 The policy allowed for pre-existing easements to
follow the relocation of poles when the poles were relocated to accommodate road construction or widening. However, the Roads Authority, the
owner of the land when Georgia Power relocated its poles in 1967, may
not have followed that policy, and the evidence indicating whether it
applied to the specific road project was inconclusive.93
Georgia Power argued that despite the foregoing factual disputes, the
plain language of the easements allowed for the 1967 relocation. The
easements provided that Georgia Power could enter the land to make

87. 241 Ga. App. at 134, 525 S.E.2d at 139 (quoting Echols, 84 Ga. App. at 612, 66
S.E.2d at 772).
88. Id. at 135, 525 S.E.2d at 140. There also was a dispute concerning whether the
easements were even thirty-feet wide. Georgia Power claimed they were, based on its
historical practice of maintaining a fifteen-foot tree clearance to the north and south of
each pole, but there was no definitive evidence, and the County disputed Georgia Power's
claim with its own evidence, including aerial photographs showing no clearance. Id., 525
S.E.2d at 139.
89. Id. at 135, 525 S.E.2d at 140.
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting Humphries v. Georgia Power Co., 224 Ga. 128, 129, 160 S.E.2d 351,352
(1968)).
92. Id. at 136, 525 S.E.2d at 140.
93. Id.
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repairs, renewals, alterations and extensions to the power lines.94
However, the court held these rights did not "encompass the right to
move the fixed poles several feet in one direction; otherwise, by
incremental adjustments, Georgia Power could eventually take over the
entire property, a result not contemplated by such language."95 The
court framed the issue as whether during 1967 the Roads Authority, as
the landowner, and Bibb County, which was in charge of utility
relocations, intended these easements should be moved from their
original locations to the new locations.96 Furthermore, the court held
Georgia Power might have intended to abandon the easements when it
relocated them and did not seek reimbursement for the relocation.97
Finally, Georgia Power argued that questions of fact remained
regarding whether the County was estopped from denying the existence
of the easements.9" The court rejected this argument for two reasons. 99 First, the court relied on Richmond County v. Pierce"0 for the
proposition that estoppel does not generally apply to the state or county,
nor can prescription run against the state or a local government in
regard to land held for the public benefit. 10 ' Second, the court noted
that "[e]stoppel requires justifiable reliance on the opposing party's
representations or conduct and a change in position to one's detriment."0 2 The court found Georgia Power presented no evidence that
it changed its position based on any action taken by Bibb County or the
City of Macon.' °3
After addressing all of the issues with respect to the validity of the
easements, the court addressed the issue of reimbursement and
concluded that even if all of the factual questions were resolved in favor
of Georgia Power, it would not settle the question of who should pay the
relocation costs."
Pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 32-4-42(6), a county
is authorized "to order any utility having poles in, on, along, over, or
under the public roads of a county road system to relocate those poles if

94. Id.
95. Id., 525 S.E.2d at 140-41.
96. Id., 525 S.E.2d at 141.
97. Id. at 136-37,525 S.E.2d at 141 (citing Walker v. Georgia Power Co., 177 Ga. App.
493, 496-97, 339 S.E.2d 728, 730-31 (1986)).
98. Id. at 137, 525 S.E.2d at 141.
99. Id.
100. 234 Ga. 274, 215 S.E.2d 665 (1975).
101. 241 Ga. App. at 137, 525 S.E.2d at 141.
102. Id. (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sapp, 223 Ga. App. 443, 445, 477 S.E.2d 869, 871
(1996)).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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the relocation is made necessary by the construction of any part of the
5
county road system (outside the corporate limits of a municipality)."'
The court concluded that the statute did not exempt poles located in the
county right-of-way and also located on pre-existing easements not
condemned by the county.10 6 The court stated that to exercise its
power, the County should follow O.C.G.A. sections 32-6-171 and 32-6173, providing that relocation "expenses are to be paid by the utility."107 However, the court found the problem with this interpretation
is that if Georgia Power had located the poles on the land prior to the
county condemning the right-of-way, the statute would be unconstitutional as a taking of private property for public purposes without just
and adequate compensation.0 8 This holding is based on the theory
that an easement is a property right, of which its owner cannot be
deprived without just and adequate compensation.' 0 9 Accordingly, the
court noted that:
[clonstrued in this context, the statutory scheme provides that the
county may require a utility, at the utility's expense, to relocate its
equipment, even if the county's right-of-way was obtained after the
utility had obtained an easement for the equipment. But in turn the
utility may seek just and adequate compensation for the loss of the use
of its old easement, which loss would include the costs necessary to
relocate to the new easement.11
Thus, because of all the factual issues, the court reversed Georgia
Power's grant of summary judgment on the issue of recoupment of
relocation expenses with respect to its thirty-seven poles and affirmed
the denial of the County's and City's motion for summary judgment on
the same."' Additionally, the court upheld the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to Georgia Power on the gratuity clause claim." 2

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 138, 519 S.E.2d 141. Section 32-6-173 of the O.C.G.A. provides for this
circumstance by stating that nothing in the article is to be construed as to deprive a utility
of its property interest because of relocation. O.C.G.A. § 32-6-173 (1996).
110. 241 Ga. App. at 138, 525 S.E.2d at 142.
111. Id., 525 S.E.2d at 141-42.
112. Id. at 138-39, 525 S.E.2d at 142. The court noted the trial court's ruling on the
trespass, delay damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees claims were not challenged
on appeal and thus were not addressed. Id.
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In Canterbury Forest Ass'n v. Collins,"3 the Georgia Court of
Appeals resolved the issue of whether restrictive covenants affecting a
subdivision that were set to expire by law may be renewed by compliance with recently enacted renewal statutes." 4 On June 15, 1975, the
Canterbury Forest Association ("the Association"), a subdivision
homeowners association, adopted bylaws and restrictive covenants for
the twenty-six lots located in the subdivision. In August 1992 Randy
The deed for that lot
Collins purchased a lot in the subdivision."'
included a provision conveying the property "subject to all valid and
enforceable restrictive covenants and easements of record." 1 6 On
March 16, 1995, Collins and the twenty-five other Association members
signed an "Amendment to the Property Owners Agreement and
Covenants" ("the Amended Covenants"). The Amended Covenants
reflected the members' agreement to extend the subdivision covenants,
set to expire by law, for an additional twenty years." 7
In September 1998 Collins built a 1400-square-foot metal structure on
his property in alleged violation of the Amended Covenants. The
Association demanded that Collins remove the building, but he refused.
The Association then filed suit. The trial court determined as a matter
of law that the original covenants had expired and that the Amended
Covenants were not effective to restrict Collins' use of his lot." 8
Accordingly, the trial court granted Collins' motion for summary
judgment." 9
On appeal the Association first contended that the trial court erred in
finding the covenants had expired twenty years after their adoption and
As discussed by the court,
were not automatically renewed. 20
O.C.G.A. section 44-5-60 generally limits the time that restrictive
covenants are effective to twenty years. 121 Between 1991 and 1993,
O.C.G.A. section 44-5-60(d) permitted owners of land subject to
restrictive covenants to renew them for an additional twenty years upon

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
years."

243 Ga. App. 425, 532 S.E.2d 736 (2000).
Id. at 428, 532 S.E.2d at 739.
Id. at 425, 532 S.E.2d at 738.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 426, 532 S.E.2d at 738.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. "[Clovenants restricting lands to certain uses shall not run for more than 20
O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(b) (1991 & Supp. 2000).
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compliance with certain conditions.12 2 Effective July 1, 1993, the
renewal provision was amended and now reads as follows:
[Clovenants restricting lands to certain uses affecting planned
subdivisions containing no fewer than 15 individual plots shall
automatically be renewed beyond the [twenty year expiration period]
unless terminated by [fifty-one percent of the plot owners within two
years prior to the expiration of the covenant.] Each such renewal shall
be for an additional 20 year period, and there shall be no limit on the
number of times such covenants shall be renewed."2'
In rejecting the Association's argument and affirming the trial court's
decision that the original covenants had expired, the court of appeals
first concluded that the 1993 amendment to O.C.G.A. section 44-5-60(d)
did not apply to the covenants at issue. 124 The court relied upon the
holding in Appalachee Enterprisesv. Walker 125 in determining that the
1993 amendment did not apply126retroactively to covenants created before
the amendment was effective.
The court further rejected the Association's argument that the
covenants were renewed under the statute in effect between 1991 and
1993.127 The version of O.C.G.A. section 44-5-60(d) that was in effect
in 1991 did not apply to the covenants for the same reason that the 1993
amendment did not apply-amendments to the statute affecting rights
in realty cannot be applied retroactively.'28 Furthermore, even if the
court found that the 1991 version of the statute did apply, it would not
have assisted plaintiff in this action. It was undisputed that the
Association had failed to comply strictly with the conditions necessary
to renew the covenants under that version of the statute. 129 The court
specifically held that substantial compliance with the statute was
insufficient, stating as follows: "Since restrictions on private property are
generally not favored in Georgia, they 'will not be enlarged or extended

122. 243 Ga. App. at 426, 532 S.E.2d at 738. "In order to renew the covenants, the
statute required that the landowners approve renewal by a two-thirds vote prior to the
expiration dates of the covenants; that an attorney conduct a title search to confirm the
record owners; and that several specific documents be prepared and filed in the county
records." Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(b) (1991)).
123. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60(d)) (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. 266 Ga. 35, 463 S.E.2d 896 (1995).
126. 243 Ga. App. at 427, 532 S.E.2d at 738.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id., 532 S.E.2d at 739.
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by construction,
and any doubt will be construed in favor of the
30
grantee."1

Notwithstanding its conclusion that the covenants had expired by law,
the court still reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
Collins. 31' The court held that pursuant to his March 1995 agreement
with the other landowners, Collins must abide by the Amended
Covenants under the theory of promissory estoppel.'3 2 The court noted
that, even though the Association had failed to execute a proper renewal
of the existing covenants, the individual landowners continued to comply
with them and continued to enforce them in accordance with the
Amended Covenants. 3 In reliance on the existence of the Amended
Covenants, the other homeowners in the subdivision took no action to
enact new covenants or otherwise protect their property interests.3
This forbearance, combined with their continued compliance with the
Amended Covenants, persuaded the court to conclude that Collins and
the other landowners who executed the Amended Covenants were bound
by them until June 2015.1 5 The court noted, however, that although
the covenants were binding on Collins and the other signatories
personally, they would not run with the3 land
and did not bind subse6
quent purchasers of the subdivision lots.

The holding in this case is significant for the owners of homes in older
subdivisions and their counsel. As stated by the court, the current
statutory provision permitting the automatic renewal of restrictive
covenants does not apply to covenants in place prior to July 1, 1993. If
the homeowners in those subdivisions desire to renew their covenants,
they must use alternative means.
IV. PURCHASE CONTRACTS AND BROKERS

In Gateway Family Worship Centers, Inc. v. H.O.P.E. Foundation
Ministries,3 7 the Georgia Court of Appeals resolved an interesting
issue concerning the definiteness with which property must be described

130. Id. (quoting England v. Atkinson, 196 Ga. 181, 184, 26 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1943)).
131. Id. at 428, 532 S.E.2d at 739.
132. Id. at 427-28, 532 S.E.2d at 739 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-3-44 (a) ("A promise which
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the
promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if
injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.")).
133. Id. at 428, 532 S.E.2d at 739.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 428 n.2, 532 SE.2d at 739 n.2.
137. 244 Ga. App. 286, 535 S.E.2d 286 (2000).
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in a sales contract before that contract may be enforced.13 The pastor
of Gateway Family Worship Centers, Inc. ("Gateway") entered into a
contract with the pastor of H.O.P.E. Foundation Ministries, Inc.
("HOPE") to sell certain improved real property. A dispute arose
between Gateway and HOPE concerning the amount of land to be
conveyed. Gateway refused to close on its purchase of the property, and
HOPE sued for breach. In that action, HOPE sought to recover its
$4,000 earnest money deposit on the property. Gateway counterclaimed,
seeking to recover the earnest money deposit along with reimbursement
of fees it paid to obtain a survey of the property.'3 9
HOPE filed a motion for summary judgment on its claim to the
earnest money and on Gateway's counterclaim for reimbursement of the
survey fees. 140 The evidence before the trial court demonstrated that
the sales contract between Gateway and HOPE described the property
as "4190 Cedar Ridge Trail located in Land Lot 192 of District 15 of
The contract
DeKalb County in the City of Stone Mountain."14 '
further contained a provision arguably incorporating by reference the
description of the property recorded by the Clerk of the Superior Court
of DeKalb County. However, the deed of record in DeKalb County stated
the property was located in Land Lots 191 and 192, rather than just in
Land Lot 192 as indicated in the contract. Because of this discrepancy,
the trial court found the property description inadequate as a matter of
law. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that HOPE was entitled to
recover its earnest money deposit but left the issue of the survey fee
reimbursement for the jury. Gateway appealed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment. 4 '
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court's determination that
the property description at issue was so indefinite that the contract
could not be enforced but disagreed with the trial court's basis for that
decision.'4 3 The court explained that a property description must be
adequate within itself, or at least provide a key that will "open the door
to extrinsic evidence which [will] lead[] unerringly to the land in
The court of appeals found a property description is
question."1'

138. Id. at 288, 535 S.E.2d at 287.
139. Id. at 286-87, 535 S.E.2d at 287.
140. Id. at 287, 535 S.E.2d at 287.
141. Id., 535 S.E.2d at 288. The trial court also granted HOPE's motion to disqualify
Gateway's lawyer as he was a material witness in the case. Id., 535 S.E.2d at 287. That
issue is not pertinent here and will not be discussed in detail.
142. Id., 535 S.E.2d at 288.
143. Id. at 286, 535 S.E.2d at 288.
144. Id. at 287,535 S.E.2d at 288 (citing Kenerly v. Yancey, 144 Ga. App. 295, 297,241
S.E.2d 28, 29 (1977)).
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inadequate if it contains nothing more than an address "within the four
corners of the contract."145 The contract in this case stated that "the
metes and bounds of the property[,] ... as well as the acreage, were to
be determined by a survey to be conducted ... after the contract was

executed."' 46 The court held that a post-contract survey can be used
to determine the exact acreage to be conveyed without rendering the
contract unenforceable, but use of a post-contract survey to provide the
only description of the property itself is insufficient for an enforceable
property sales contract.' 47 The extrinsic evidence or "key" referenced
in the contract must exist at the time the contract is created. 14
Because the property description in the contract was insufficient on the
date of the contract, HOPE was not obligated to comply with any
provision of the sales contract. Thus, the trial court accurately granted
summary judgment in favor of HOPE for the return of the earnest
money.' 49 The court of appeals also affirmed the trial court's finding
that the
issue of who should pay the survey cost was a question for the
50

jury.

This case confirms the importance of a clear and unambiguous
description of the property subject to a contract for sale. It also firmly
establishes the inability of parties to render their contract enforceable
by agreeing that a proper description will be generated after the contract
is executed. The property description must be complete and proper at
the time the parties execute it in order for either party to enforce it
against the other.
In Johnson v. Oriental Weavers Rug Manufacturing Co., 15 1 the
Georgia Court of Appeals determined whether an unlicensed real estate
broker is entitled to a commission when the sales contract expressly
provides for a commission to be paid to the broker.'5 2 Robert 0.
Johnson, manager of real property owned by Smith Foster, brokered the
sale of part of Foster's property to Oriental Weavers Rug Manufacturing
Company, Inc. ("Oriental"). Johnson brought suit against Oriental and
Foster when they refused to pay the five percent brokerage commission
53
expressly due to him according to the terms of the contract.

145. Id. at 288, 535 S.E.2d at 288.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing Royal v. Bland Properties, 175 Ga. App. 250, 251, 333 S.E.2d 145, 146
(1985)).

148.

Id.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id., 535 S.E.2d at 288-89 (citing Royal, 175 Ga. App. at 251, 333 S.E.2d at 146).
Id. at 289, 535 S.E.2d at 289.
241 Ga. App. 15, 525 S.E.2d 738 (1999).
Id. at 15-16, 525 S.E.2d at 738.
Id. at 15, 525 S.E.2d at 738.
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The general rule is that a "person doing business in Georgia without
the requisite real estate license has no standing to sue for commissions
allegedly earned." 54 The court of appeals applied this rule in finding
the contract provision regarding Johnson's commission unenforceable,
even though this outcome provides a benefit to the contract parties at
the expense of Johnson, who had already performed the services for
which he was to be paid. 5 Because the rule is based on public policy,
the court held it could not be circumvented even if it were shown that
Foster and Oriental deceitfully intended not to pay Johnson all
along. 5 s The rule is one of standing to sue;
57 thus, it applies before the
court ever reaches the merits of the case.
The court then analyzed whether O.C.G.A. section 43-40-29(a)(8)
provided a way for Johnson to gain standing to sue the buyer and the
seller. 5 ' That Code section provides that the rule requiring real estate
brokers to be licensed does not apply to "[any person employed on a fulltime basis by the owner of property for the purpose of providing property
management services or community association management services,
selling, buying, leasing, managing, auctioning, or otherwise dealing with
such property."5 9
The court relied on a Georgia Supreme Court case holding that this
statute was not intended to provide a broad means of circumventing the
rule that only licensed brokers have standing to sue for nonpayment of
commissions.' 60 Because Johnson had the expectation of receiving a
fee for brokerage services, rather than services incidental to the normal
fulfillment of his job, he is disqualified
for the brokerage commission
16 1
because he is not a licensed broker.
The result in Oriental Weavers Rug Manufacturing Co. should have
been obvious. Public policy prohibits unlicensed brokers from receiving
brokerage fees-even when the fee was provided for in the sales contract.

154. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 43-40-24(a) (1999)).
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Krizan v. Newman & Co., 153 Ga. App. 337, 339, 265 S.E.2d 68, 70
(1980)).
157. Id.

158. Id. at 15-16, 525 S.E.2d at 738-39.
159. O.C.G.A. § 43-40-29(a)(8) (1999). The point of the statute is that the persons who
qualify are not deemed to be acting as "brokers." Rather, they are full-time employees of
the owner of the property and are compensated accordingly.
160. 241 Ga. App. at 16,525 S.E.2d at 738 (citing Bechenko v. Fulton Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n of Atlanta, Inc., 244 Ga. 733, 734-35, 261 S.E.2d 643, 644-45 (1979)). The court in
Bechenko held that "O.C.G.A. § 43-40-29(a) does not apply to any full time employee who
receives or intends to receive a fee, commission or other valuable consideration for
brokerage services." Id. (citing Bechenko, 244 Ga. at 734, 261 S.E.2d at 644-45).
161. Id. at 16, 525 S.E.2d at 739.
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Unless the plaintiff can bring himself within the narrow exception to
that general rule created by O.C.G.A. section 43-40-29(a)(8), no
unlicensed broker may bring suit to recover real estate commissions
allegedly owed to him.
V.

FORECLOSURES

In Atlanta Dwellings, Inc. v. Wright,'6' the Georgia Supreme Court
examined whether it is proper for a trial court to grant an interlocutory
injunction halting a foreclosure when the lender's conduct under a
forbearance agreement may constitute waiver of strict performance of
the underlying security deed. 6 ' Private Mortgage Funding Corporation ("Private Mortgage") held a promissory note from Wright, the
repayment of which was secured by Wright's interest in the Azalea
Gardens and an assignment of the rents and leases from that property.
Wright defaulted on the loan, and Private Mortgage obtained a judgment
against her. Wright then entered into a forbearance agreement with
Private Mortgage. The agreement allowed Wright to payoff her other
defaulted loans with Private Mortgage and leave the Azalea Gardens
loan outstanding with a short payoff on several conditions. 64
Private Mortgage assigned all its rights under the original court
judgment, the forbearance agreement, and the Azalea Gardens loan to
Atlanta Dwellings, Inc. ("ADI"). After taking the assignment, ADI sent
a notice of default to Wright claiming that she breached the loan and the
forbearance agreement by failing to pay real property ad valorem taxes
from 1992 through 1997. ADI also claimed Wright was in breach
because she failed to obtain the lender's consent when she transferred
the property to Azalea Gardens, Inc. in 1993. After Wright failed to cure
the alleged default, ADI filed a complaint against her.'65 ADI sought
to have the court grant the following relief: "(1) [A]llow a non-judicial
foreclosure of the property; (2) issue an order restraining Wright from
disposing of rents, issues, and profits in connection with the Azalea
Gardens property; and (3) declare that ADI's interest in the rents, issues
and profits of the property was perfected."'66
Wright obtained a temporary restraining order from the trial court
staying the foreclosure. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court
also granted Wright's request for interlocutory injunction. Based on the
evidence presented at the hearing, the court concluded that questions of

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

272 Ga. 231, 527 S.E.2d 854 (2000).
Id. at 232-33, 527 S.E.2d at 855.
Id. at 231-32, 527 S.E.2d at 855.
Id. at 232, 527 S.E.2d at 855.
Id.
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fact existed for the jury to resolve regarding whether Wright had
defaulted on the forbearance agreement.'67
ADI appealed the trial court's grant of interlocutory injunction to
Wright. ADI also sent Wright a second demand note on the forbearance
agreement, asserting that Wright had defaulted by failing to pay 1998
ad valorem taxes due on the Azalea Gardens. The trial court again
issued an injunction preventing foreclosure following the alleged default
until a jury could resolve the questions of fact and ADI's appeal.6 "
On appeal the supreme court stated that "'[i]f there is any question as
to the construction of a deed to secure debt either by virtue of its original
terms or a course of conduct which waives strict performance, a question
for the jury is presented.""6 9 The court found it was not unreasonable
for the trial court to find questions concerning the construction of the
forbearance agreement. 7 ° If Wright proved that the language of the
forbearance agreement forgave the past defaults or that the lender failed
to call the loan for these defaults for an extended period of time, strict
performance of the security deed could be deemed waived.' 7' Therefore, the lender would not be entitled to foreclose because of those
alleged defaults. Because questions of fact existed for the jury to
resolve, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's grant of interlocutory injunction.'72
In reaching its decision, the court noted a lower court's order that
stated the "mere existence" of questions of fact or unresolved issues
warrant the grant of an injunction to maintain the status quo between
the parties.'
That standard favors borrowers and may delay creditors in their attempts to pursue self-help remedies for which they
bargained in their loan arrangements. As a result, creditors must be
particularly diligent to ensure that their actions in dealing with debtors
may not be construed as waiver of strict compliance with the terms of
any work-out arrangement.
In Machen v. Wolande Management Group, Inc., ' 4 the Georgia
Supreme Court analyzed what steps a party must take to redeem

167. Id. at 232-33, 527 S.E.2d at 855.
168. Id. at 233, 527 S.E.2d at 855-56.
169. Id., 527 S.E.2d at 856 (quoting Benton v. Patel, 257 Ga. 669, 672, 362 S.E.2d 217,
220 (1987)).
170. Id. at 234, 527 S.E.2d at 856.
171. Id. at 233-34, 527 S.E.2d at 856 (citing West v. Koufman, 259 Ga. 505, 506, 384
S.E.2d 664, 666 (1989)).
172. Id. at 234, 527 S.E.2d at 856.
173. Id. at 232-33, 527 S.E.2d at 855.
174. 271 Ga. 163, 517 S.E.2d 58 (1999).
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175
property sold at a tax sale and when those steps must be taken.
The court held that "the right to redeem property sold under a tax
execution is conditioned upon 'the payment of the redemption price or
the amount required for redemption.' ' 171 Specifically, the court held
that filing a lawsuit within the time provided for redemption is77
insufficient to comply with the applicable four-year limitation period.
The property at issue in Machen was located on Church Street in
Decatur, Georgia. Southeastern Mortgage and Investment Company,
Inc. owned the property until it was sold in July 1994 to satisfy past due
taxes. At the time of the tax sale, First Federal Savings & Loan
Association of Americus ("First Federal") held the first security deed on
the property, and John W. Henderson, Sr. held the second security deed.
In January 1996 Wolande Management Group, Inc. ("Wolande") acquired
the property from the grantee of the tax deed. Wolande then filed a
quiet title action to foreclose the right of redemption. In December 1997
First Federal's successor in interest quitclaimed its interest in the
property. Thereafter, Wolande dismissed its quiet title action. 7 '
In April 1998, within four years after the tax sale, the heirs of John
W. Henderson, Sr. (the "Hendersons"), as his successors in interest to the
property, brought suit seeking a declaration that they had a right to
redeem the property and that the security deed they held was now in
first priority. Wolande brought a counterclaim seeking a declaration
that the Hendersons did not have a right to redeem the property. In
August 1998 the court held a bench trial on the Hendersons' action for
declaratory relief. At the conclusion of that trial, the court ruled that
the Hendersons were barred from exercising their prior right of
redemption because the four-year statutory period had expired.'7 9
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the trial court.' As the
In order
appellate court noted, redemption is a "self-help remedy."'
to take advantage of that remedy, the person seeking to redeem property
must tender the amount owed before the statutory period expires. If the
owner does not wish to pay the sum directly to the creditor, the owner

175. Id. at 164-65, 517 S.E.2d at 59-60.
176. Id. at 165, 517 S.E.2d at 60 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40 (1999)).
177. Id. at 164, 517 S.E.2d at 59 (citing O.C.G.A. § 48-4-48(b) (1999). This same Code
section was at issue in a case discussed in last year's survey. See T. Daniel Brannan &
William J. Sheppard, Real Property, 51 MERCER L. REV. 441, 444 (1999) (discussing
Blizzard v. Moniz, 271 Ga. 50, 518 S.E.2d 407 (1999)). However, the issue this year is
slightly different.
178. 271 Ga. at 163-64, 517 S.E.2d at 59.
179. Id. at 164, 517 S.E.2d at 59.
180. Id. at 166, 517 S.E.2d at 60-61.
181. Id. at 164, 517 S.E.2d at 59.
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can pay the sums into the registry of court until any dispute regarding
the redemption of the property is resolved.1 1 2 As the court stated,
paying the sums due before the expiration of the statute of limitations
is the only procedure to redeem property sold at tax sale or foreclosure,
unless the creditor has waived tender of the amount." 3 The court
found tender of the amount could not have been waived because an
attempt to tender the amount is necessary before the lender can possibly
waive it." 8 '
This case reveals that an owner wishing to redeem property sold at
tax sale or foreclosure must make some sort of attempt to pay the
amount owed. Otherwise, filing a suit for the court to determine the
owner's right to redeem will not act to toll the statute of limitations
period.

VI.

EMINENT DOMAIN

In City of Marietta v. Edwards,' the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed a ruling of the Georgia Court of Appeals regarding whether the
City of Marietta ("the City") had lost its ability to condemn property
In July 1993 the
because of a bad faith exercise of its right to do so.'
City solicited bids for the sale of a piece of property. In September 1993
the City accepted Julian and Nancy Edwards' bid. In October counsel
for the City asked the Edwardses to consider selling a portion of the
property back to the City for use as a right-of-way. The Edwardses then
contacted Tom Boland, the City's agent and facilitator of the sale, to ask
whether the City would condemn the right-of-way if the Edwardses
decided not to sell the land back. The parties disagreed about whether
and to what extent Boland assured the Edwardses that the City would
not exercise its power of eminent domain.'87 However, Julian Edwards' testimony at trial revealed that Boland told him that the "matter
The sale closed in November,
would, more than likely, be dropped."'
and the Edwardses improved the property. The following June the City
filed a petition to condemn the right-of-way, affecting the Edwardses'
property and a portion of a neighbor's adjoining property.8 9

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id. at 169, 517 S.E.2d at 60.
Id.
Id. at 165-66, 517 S.E.2d at 60.
271 Ga. 349, 519 S.E.2d 217 (1999).
Id. at 351, 519 S.E.2d at 219.
Id. at 349, 519 S.E.2d at 217.
Id. at 350, 519 S.E.2d at 218.
Id. at 349, 519 S.E.2d at 217.
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The special master recommended dismissal of the petition on the
ground that the City had exercised its condemnation powers in "bad
faith, arbitrarily, capriciously, and beyond powers conferred by law."9 '
The superior court, on cross motions for summary judgment, granted the
City's motion. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling
regarding the neighbor's property, but reversed the ruling concerning the
Edwards' property.' 9 ' The supreme court granted certiorari and held
the court of appeals erred in holding that a genuine issue of material
fact remained pertaining to the City's bad faith exercise of its power of

eminent domain. 192
The supreme court held that, even construing Boland's statement
regarding the City's condemnation intentions in the light most favorable
to the Edwardses, the statement was equivocal and not a guarantee of
the City's action.' 93 Boland's statement indicated only that the City
probably would not exercise its legal right of condemnation. 194 The
court further found that Boland's statements would not serve as proof of
the City's bad faith in the condemnation.' 95 According to the court,
"there is a distinction between the City's sale of its own property and the
exercise of its power to condemn the property of its citizens." 9 6
Boland's statement in his capacity as the City's agent for the sale of the
property had nothing to do with the subsequent condemning of the
Edwardses' property, and thus, the court held it could not be used as
evidence to show bad faith in the condemnation.' 9 Finally, the court
stated that the Edwardses sought "to estop the City from the exercise of
its right of eminent domain by asserting Boland's unauthorized
statements as evidence of the City's bad faith."'"
It is well-settled
that "the City cannot be estopped by 'the acts of any officer done in the
exercise of an unconferred power."""
The supreme court also rejected the court of appeals conclusion that
the city intentionally misled the Edwardses to induce them to consummate the purchase. 20 0 The evidence showed the Edwardses' bid was
accepted several weeks before Boland's alleged statement. Thus, the

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id.
Id., 519 S.E.2d at 217-18.
Id. at 349, 351, 519 S.E.2d at 218-19.
Id. at 350, 519 S.E.2d at 218.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 24-3-33 (1995)).
Id.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 45-6-5 (1990)).
Id. at 350-51, 519 S.E.2d at 218.
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Edwardses had entered into a legal, nonfraudulent contract with the
City to purchase the property even before the conversation with
Boland.2"' Once they did so, they were bound to fulfill the contract
even if it was "unwise or disadvantageous to them."" 2 Moreover, once
"the City realized that it should have retained a portion of the property
for an expanded right-of-way, it could have condemned a portion of [the
Edwardses'] contract rights prior to consummation of the contract."0 3
Therefore, the Edwardses could not use the excuse that the City had
decided to condemn part of the property that the Edwardses were
obligated to buy as grounds to refuse to consummate the sale. Because
the City did not make the alleged misrepresentation until after the
contract was formed, and because the Edwardses already were obligated
to buy, no evidence showed fraudulent misrepresentation on the part of
the City. Ultimately, while the Edwardses may have shown that the
City's condemnation plans were uncertain, there was not a showing of
bad faith.2°
Furthermore, the court held the improvements made to the property
after the sale but prior to the condemnation did not affect the City's
right to condemn the right-of-way and did not suggest bad faith.20 5
The court noted that the City would have to pay just and adequate
compensation for the right-of-way it sought based on the value of the
newly-renovated property on the date of the taking.2° Therefore, the
court held that "the fact that the City condemned the right-of-way after
the renovation did not constitute evidence of bad faith."2 7 Finally, the
court noted no evidence of bad faith existed in the stated purpose for the
condemnation. 0 8
In its reasoning, the court in City of Marietta looked to previous cases
and stated the following: (1) "This court has been reluctant to find bad
faith on the part of the condemnor in its determination of public purpose
in the exercise of the right of eminent domain.";209 and (2) "[tjhis court

201. Id. at 350, 519 S.E.2d at 218.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.

204. Id. at 350-51, 519 S.E.2d at 218. The court noted that "'bad faith' in this context
is comparable to 'conscious wrongdoing motivated by improper interest or ill will.'" Id.
at 351,519 S.E.2d at 218 (quoting Craven v. Georgia Power Co., 248 Ga. 79,80,281 S.E.2d
568, 569 (1981)) (citations omitted).
205. Id. at 351, 519 S.E.2d at 218-19.
206. Id., 519 S.E.2d at 218.
207. Id.
208. Id., 519 S.E.2d at 219.
209. Id. (quoting Concept Capital Corp. v. DeKalb County, 255 Ga. 452,453,339 S.E.2d
583, 585 (1986)).
...
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has found bad faith in the determination of public purpose only when
the stated purpose was a subterfuge."2 1 ° The court continued, noting
that "[i]ndeed, the import of the [the second holding above] . . . 'is that
a condemning authority may not utilize the power of eminent domain to
restrict a legitimate activity in which the state has an interest."''
Accordingly, like the Edwardses, persons who seek to avoid condemnation of their property, or a portion of that property, will be hard-pressed
to prove bad faith by the condemning authority as a basis for doing so.
In Department of Transportationv. Rasmussen,2 12 the Georgia Court
of Appeals addressed the issue of consequential damages in an eminent
domain action.213 On March 13, 1997, the Georgia Department of
Transportation ("DOT") condemned 0.216 acres of a 0.990 acre tract of
land owned by Lloyd Rasmussen in order to widen Highway 124 at Rock
Chapel Road in DeKalb County. The DOT also condemned a permanent
easement encompassing 0.0689 acres of the tract. The condemned parcel
included a building that, at the time of the taking, was used as an
automotive repair shop but had once housed a service station. Several
underground storage tanks existed on the property and were located on
a portion of the land retained by Rasmussen. 4
Testimony at trial revealed that various state and federal regulations
required the tanks either be removed or closed by December 23,
1998.215 Additionally, testimony showed that "the property not taken
could not be restored to the value it had at the time of the taking absent
being made ready for commercial development and the property could
not be redeveloped without removing the tanks."216
The DOT offered Rasmussen $28,136 as compensation for the taking,
and Rasmussen appealed. A jury awarded him $52,520, including
$46,020 for the market value of the property taken and $6,500 in
consequential damages based on evidence of the cost to remove the
tanks.217 On appeal the DOT challenged the trial court's evidentiary
admission of consequential damages arguing that "the
removal of the
21
storage tanks was not a consequence of the taking." 1

210. Id. (citing Carrol County v. City of Bremen, 256 Ga. 281, 282, 347 S.E.2d 598, 599
(1986); Earth Management v. Heard County, 248 Ga. 442,448,283 S.E.2d 455,461(1981)).
211. Id. (quoting Concept Capital Corp., 255 Ga. at 454, 339 S.E.2d at 585).
212. 244 Ga. App. 245, 534 S.E.2d 573 (2000).
213. Id. at 245, 534 S.E.2d at 574.
214. Id.
215. Id. "Closure" in this context means that the tanks must either be removed or
filled with inert material.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's admission of the
evidence. 219 First, the court gave credence to Rasmussen's expert who
had testified at trial that Rasmussen "would not have incurred the cost
of removing the tanks absent the taking."220 He testified that the
building housing the automotive repair shop "could have remained in
place for an indefinite number of years,.. . [and] that had the building
remained in place, the tanks could have been" closed properly by filling
them with an inert material, such as sand.22 ' The expert further
testified that the demolition of the building due to the taking required
Rasmussen to remove the tanks on the remaining parcel at a cost of
approximately $10,000 in order to restore its value as commercial
property ready for development.22 2 Relying on Simon v. Department
223
the court first noted:
of Transportation,
In a condemnation proceeding involving a partial taking, two elements
of damage are to be considered. The first is the market value of the
property actually taken. The second is the consequential damage that
will "'naturallyand proximately arise to the remainder of the owner's
the devoting of
property from the taking of the part which is taken
224 and
it to the purposes for which it is condemned.' ,
The court held that based on Georgia law and the evidence presented by
cost to remove the storage tanks proximately arose from
the expert, 22the
5
the taking.
The DOT also argued the trial court abused its discretion in permitting evidence that the DOT placed its right-of-way line in such a way
that the taking deliberately excluded the land containing the storage
tanks. 22' Thus, the DOT claimed, this error "allowed counsel for
Rasmussen to inject the issue of bad faith without following the
The court
procedure outlined in O.C.G.A. section 32-3-11(c)." 227
rejected the DOT's argument, concluding that the evidence was relevant
to show that the tanks remained on Rasmussen's parcel. 22 The court
stated as follows:

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
at 778).
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 246, 534 S.E.2d at 575.
Id. at 245, 534 S.E.2d at 574.
Id.
Id. at 245-46, 534 S.E.2d at 574.
245 Ga. 478, 265 S.E.2d 777 (1980).
244 Ga. App. at 246, 534 S.E.2d at 574 (quoting Simon, 245 Ga. at 478, 265 S.E.2d
Id.
Id., 534 S.E.2d at 574-75.
Id., 534 S.E.2d at 575.
Id.
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It is well-settled that "(u)nless the potential for prejudice in the
admission of evidence substantially outweighs its probative value, the
Georgia rule favors the admission of any relevant evidence, no matter
how slight its probative value. Evidence of doubtful relevancy or
competency should be admitted and its weight left to the jurors."229
This case demonstrated one situation in which consequential damages
are available in a condemnation action. Because there are a great many
present and former gasoline stations located on or near right-of-ways,
the factual scenario present in Rasmussen is likely to recur in the future
and the holding will provide instruction to the owners of land subjected
to condemnation.
VII.

LANDLORD AND TENANT

As in the previous two survey periods, the issue of a landlord's liability
for injuries sustained by a tenant as a result of criminal activity on the
leased property was an issue in a case pending before the appellate
courts.23 ° In FPI Atlanta, L.P. v. Seaton,23 ' the Georgia Court of
Appeals held landlords have a nondelagable duty to protect the leased
premises from "foreseeable third party criminal conduct" even when the
tenants are tricked into voluntarily allowing the criminal to enter the
property." 2 The court also found that the security providers contractually obligated to protect the landlord's leased property may, under
certain circumstances, become liable to the tenants on the theory that
the tenants are third-party beneficiaries of the contract with the
landlord.3 3
Plaintiffs in Seaton, tenants of the Timber Trace Apartments, sued
defendants Fogelman Properties, Inc. and Avron B. Fogelman, general
partners of the landlord/limited partnership that owned and operated
the 989-unit complex. Plaintiffs sought to recover damages based upon
injuries they suffered during a robbery on the premises. Plaintiffs also
sued Corporate Security Services ("CSS"), the company providing

229. Id. (quoting Norman v. State, 197 Ga. App. 333, 336, 398 S.E.2d 395, 398 (1990)).
230. See T. Daniel Brannan & William J. Sheppard, Real Property,51 MERCER L. REV.
441, 456-58 (1999); T. Daniel Brannan & William J. Sheppard, Real Property,50 MERCER
L. REV. 307, 329-32 (1998). As the authors suggested in 1998, the decision in Doe v.
Prudential-Bache/A.G.Spanos Realty Partners,L.P., 268 Ga. 604, 492 S.E.2d 865 (1997),
concerning the standard for showing foreseeability of injury from criminal activity has
generated several appellate opinions. 50 MERCER L. REV.at 331.
231. 240 Ga. App. 880, 524 S.E.2d 524 (1999).
232. Id. at 882, 524 S.E.2d at 528.
233. Id. at 888, 524 S.E.2d at 532.
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security guards at the apartment,23 4 and James Boone, the particular
security guard on duty that night.
Within the five years preceding the incident that was the subject of
plaintiffs' claims, there were fifty-nine burglaries, five armed robberies,
one robbery, one kidnapping, two murders, four aggravated assaults, one
simple battery, and one criminal trespass at the property. Despite this
history of crime, the landlord provided security only in the form of offduty and unarmed DeKalb officers. Those officers were contractually
authorized only to investigate possible disturbances or suspicious
behavior and call the police when necessary. The apartment complex
was not equipped with fences, gates or controlled access. Although the
management had considered installation of these sorts of devices, they
were not installed at the time of the incident in question.235
On the night plaintiffs were injured, two patrolmen were on duty and
noticed the robbers' car but did not find anything suspicious about it at
the time. The criminals tricked plaintiff Seals into letting them enter
the apartment. There, they tied her up and put her in the closet. The
criminals waited for plaintiff Seaton to arrive. When Seaton arrived,
they took him at gunpoint to his place of work where the criminals stole
$10,000.236

All of the parties moved for summary judgment before the trial court.
The trial court denied the Fogelman defendants' summary judgment
motion on the issue of negligence but granted it on the issue of nuisance.
The court found that a jury issue existed concerning whether plaintiff
Seals assumed the risk of the injuries she suffered and whether Seaton
had released his claims against defendants. Because plaintiffs' tort
claims remained pending, the court denied the Fogelman defendants'
motion for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages. The
court entered judgment for defendants CCS and Boone as a matter of
law. The court refused to enter summary judgment for plaintiffs.237
On appeal the court first determined that a jury question existed
concerning whether the Fogelman defendants breached a legal duty to
plaintiffs.3 8 Under Georgia law a landlord is only liable for criminal
conduct occurring on the premises if that conduct is reasonably
foreseeable because similar criminal conduct has already occurred on or

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 880-81, 524 S.E.2d at 526-27.
Id. at 880, 883, 524 S.E.2d at 527-28.
Id. at 881-82, 524 S.E.2d at 527.
Id. at 882, 524 S.E.2d at 527-28.
Id., 524 S.E.2d at 528.
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near the premises. 2 9 The test is whether "a reasonable person would
take ordinary precautions to protect his or her ...

tenants against the

risk posed by that type of activity."240 The court noted that while the
crime in question does not have to be identical to previous crimes, "the
location, nature and extent of the prior criminal activities and their
likeness, proximity or other relationship to the crime
in question" must
41
be examined to determine liability of the landlord.1
The issue of reasonable foreseeability is generally a jury question
when the facts indicate foreseeability.2 42 Therefore, because of the
extensive past crime in the area, the court found the trial court properly
denied summary judgment to the Fogelman defendants even though it
was undisputed that an identical crime had never occurred on the
premises.2 43 The court also held that the issue of causation between
the alleged breach of duty and the damages incurred by plaintiffs
presented an issue of fact. 2" The court held that when an independent criminal act of a third party was a reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the landlord's negligence, 2that
negligence is a concurrent
4
proximate cause of the criminal conduct. 1
The court held plaintiff Seal's claim was not barred by assumption of
the risk grounds because defendants failed to show that Seal had actual
specific knowledge of the danger involved when she let the criminals into
the apartment.246 The court also held the trial court did not err in
denying the Fogelman defendants' partial summary judgment motion as
to punitive damages.247 The court made this conclusion because under
Georgia law punitive damages are available in tort cases when the
plaintiff shows the defendant had an "entire want of care which would
raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences."24 8
Finally, the court held the trial court erred when it granted summary
judgment to CCS and Boone.2 49 The court found that normally an
independent contractor, such as the security providers here, will not be
held liable for the landlord's "personal and nondelagable duty ...

to

239. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 (1981); Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 492-93,
405 S.E.2d 474, 476 (1991)).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 884, 524 S.E.2d at 529.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 884-85, 524 S.E.2d at 529.
247. Id. at 885, 524 S.E.2d at 530.

248. Id. at 885-86, 524 at S.E.2d at 530 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(b) (Supp. 2000)).
249. Id. at 886, 524 S.E.2d at 530.
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keep the premises and approaches safe."25" However, employing the
rules of contract construction, the court examined the contract between
the Fogelman defendants and the security defendants and found the
"contract clearly indicates that parties not expressly named in the
contract are to be affected by the contract as third-party beneficiaries."2 ' The court based this ruling on finding that "the contract
expressly excluded and limited liability only as to property but did not
expressly exclude or limit liability for personal injury."252 The court
found that whether the security providers breached their primary
contractual duties to the tenants by failing to investigate or report any
conduct to the police remained an issue for the jury.25 '
In a special concurrence, Presiding Judge Pope agreed with the
findings of the majority regarding "duty, breach, proximate cause, and
punitive damages for the [Fogelman defendants]."25 4 However, Judge
Pope did not agree with the majority that questions of fact existed on the
issue of the tenants' status as third-party beneficiaries of the security
contract. 5 Judge Pope refused to find the security company's failure
to disclaim liability for personal injuries to tenants while disclaiming
liability for property damage was sufficient to create third-party
liability.25 6 However, Judge Pope did conclude that a cause of action
against the security providers might have arisen if they reasonably led
the tenants to believe that guards were providing security for the
tenants and if the security guards were negligent.257
In Wadkins v. Smallwood,258 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that
under Georgia statutory law a landlord's failure to maintain a smoke
detector in good condition cannot be introduced in a trial on the
landlord's negligence.2 59 Plaintiff, Katina Wadkins, sued the owners
of her apartment, Michael and Josie Smallwood, because she was injured
and her child was killed in an apartment fire when the landlords had
not maintained the hard-wired smoke detector or installed an additional
battery-operated smoke detector. At trial the jury found for the
Smallwoods. Wadkins appealed.260
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Id. (citing Feggans v. Kroger Co., 223 Ga. App. 47, 50, 476 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1996)).
Id. at 887, 524 S.E.2d at 531.
Id. at 888, 524 S.E.2d at 532.
Id.
Id. at 889, 524 S.E.2d at 532 (Pope, J., concurring specially).
Id.
Id. at 890, 524 S.E.2d at 533.
Id.
243 Ga. App. 134, 530 S.E.2d 498 (2000).
Id. at 136, 530 S.E.2d at 502.
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The apartment duplex at issue in this case is federally assisted Section
VIII housing for low-income families. As part of the agreement the
landlords entered into for ten years, the Columbus Housing Authority
("CHA") hired a contractor to renovate the apartments, and the CHA
periodically inspected the apartments to recommend needed repairs to
the landlords. At the time of the incident, applicable federal regulations
required that at least one battery-operated smoke detector be located on
each level of the Section VIII housing unit after October of 1992.261
Further, the City of Columbus building code required the installation of
smoke detectors in compliance with manufacturer suggestion. Also,
Georgia law required the installation of battery-operated smoke
detectors in apartments after 1994.262

The landlords were never informed of any malfunction with the hardwired smoke detector, and they never installed a battery-operated smoke
detector because they were ignorant of the Georgia law. The trial court
would not allow Wadkins to introduce evidence of the landlord's failure
to maintain a battery-operated smoke detector because the trial court's
interpretation of O.C.G.A. section 25-2-40 only allowed Wadkins to
introduce evidence that the Smallwoods were required to install a
battery-operated smoke detector.263 In an opinion written by Chief
Judge Johnson, the court of appeals agreed with the trial court's
interpretation of the statute because O.C.G.A. section 25-2-40(g) states
that failure to maintain a smoke detector cannot be used as evidence of
negligence in a civil case. 2"
Wadkins argued on appeal that the exclusion in O.C.G.A. section 25-240(g) is applicable to tenants but not landlords.6 5 The court found
this argument to be without merit because neither the actual language
of section 25-2-40(g) nor any of the related statutes limits its applicability to tenants. 266 The court further held the exclusion in section 25-240(g) overrides landlords' general statutory and common law duties
because of the rule of statutory construction that the more specific

261. Id. at 135, 530 S.E.2d at 501.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 136, 530 S.E.2d at 502 (citing O.C.G.A. § 25-2-40 (Supp. 2000)).
264. Id. The statute states:
Failure to maintain a smoke detector in good working order in a dwelling... in
violation of this Code section shall not be considered evidence of negligence, shall
not be considered by the court on any question of liability of any person ... and
shall not diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or occupancy of such dwelling.
O.C.G.A. § 25-2-40(g).
265. 243 Ga. App. at 137, 530 S.E.2d at 502.
266. Id., 530 S.E.2d at 502-03.
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statutes govern over the more general statutes.2 67 Thus, the court
found the trial court did not err in prohibiting the introduction of
evidence that the Smallwoods failed to maintain a battery-operated
smoke detector.2 6
At trial Wadkins moved for directed verdict because the Smallwoods
did not install a battery-operated smoke detector and did not maintain
the hard-wire smoke detector.269 The trial court denied Wadkins'
motion and the appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling. 7 0 The
appellate court reasoned that there was enough evidence before the trial
court to pose a jury question on whether the lack of operable smoke
detectors proximately caused Wadkins' injuries and the child's
death. 271 Evidence before the trial court included testimony by a fire
investigator that it was possible that operable smoke detectors would not
have prevented the injuries complained of in the action.272
The remainder of the court's opinion deals with Wadkins' appeal
regarding the trial court's refusal to charge the jury with the instructions she presented.27 3 The court concluded that the trial court's
general charge to the jury was a more accurate and nonargumentative
statement of the law and explanation of the verdict.2 74 Judges2 McMur75
ray and Phipps concurred with Chief Judge Johnson's opinion.
This case points out that, though a landlord may have general duties
to keep the leased premises safe, the specific statutory exclusion from
liability on this duty provided in O.C.G.A. section 25-2-40(g) governs
over the general. Thus, a landlord must keep a battery-operated smoke
detector in good repair on the premises, but the landlord's failure to do
so cannot be used against the landlord to prove negligence.
VIII.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The Georgia General Assembly passed only one noteworthy statute
related to real property during the 1999 Legislative Session. Senate Bill
343 amends O.C.G.A. section 22-3-60 by replacing the entire Code
section.276 The bill also adds sections 22-3-63 and 22-3-140.277 Prior
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Id.
Id. at 138, 530 S.E.2d at 503.
Id. at 139, 530 S.E.2d at 503.
Id. at 138-39, 530 S.E.2d at 503.
Id. at 138, 530 S.E.2d at 503.
Id. at 139-42, 530 S.E.2d at 504-06.
Id. at 139, 530 S.E.2d at 503-04.
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to its amendment, section 22-3-60 allowed nongovernmental entities
constructing or operating a waterworks, water distribution system, a
sewerage collection system or a sewage treatment and disposal system
to condemn property or property interests if it was necessary to carry out
the business of the nongovernmental entity.278 As a result of Senate
Bill 343, section 22-3-60 now provides that nongovernmental entities can
only condemn property or property interests if consent by resolution or
ordinance is first obtained from the governing authority of the political
subdivision in which the nongovernmental entity is operating.2 9 The
new section 22-3-63 limits the ability of nongovernmental entities to
condemn land for use in connection with the operation of waterworks
and sewerage systems. Under that Code section, the power of condemnation may only be exercised by nongovernmental agencies operating
large sewerage systems (1,000 or more) and customers, and then only in
counties in which the system was in operation on May 1, 2000, and
adjacent counties. 2 0 Under the new section 22-3-140, governmental
agencies operating a waterworks and sewerage systems are permitted to
use, in addition to the methods of condemnation contained in Title 22,
the "declaration of taking method" of condemnation as provided in Title
32.21 The enactment of that statute should make it easier for public

Any nongovernmental entity constructing, owning, or operating any waterworks
or sanitary sewerage system, or both, in this state shall have the right, power,
privilege, and authority to lease, purchase, or condemn property or any interest
therein, including easements, or to receive donations or grants of property or any
interest therein, including easements, for the purpose of constructing and
operating a waterworks, a water distribution system, a sewerage collection
system, or a sewage treatment and disposal system, or any combination of such
systems or facilities; provided, however, that prior to condemning property in any
political subdivision, any such entity shall first obtain the consent of the governing
authority of such political subdivision, which consent may be granted by resolution
or ordinance.
277. O.C.G.A. section 22-3-63 provides an exception to the consent requirement of
section 22-3-60 for applicable nongovernmental entities in operation before the enactment
of the bill. O.C.G.A. section 22-3-140 provides the power of eminent domain for
governmental entities "owning or operating a sewage collection, treatment, or disposal
system, a water or waste-water system, a gas or gas line system, an electrical or electrical
line system, or a drain or storm-water system."
278. O.C.G.A. § 22-3-60 (1982 & Supp. 1999).
279. Id. § 22-3-60 (Supp. 2000) (adding the proviso "provided, however, that prior to
condemning property in any political subdivision, any such entity shall first obtain the
consent of the governing authority of such political subdivision, which consent may be
granted by resolution or ordinance").
280. Id. § 22-3-63.
281. Id. § 22-3-140.

2000]

REAL PROPERTY

419

waterworks and sewerage systems to obtain easements over private
property in order to expand their systems.

*

*
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